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I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the law in virtual worlds, though the focus has
been on the more obviously applicable areas of the law, namely property,
copyright, and crime. Indeed, in the few instances when disputes involving virtual
worlds have reached a federal court, the focus has usually been on contract or
copyright claims. It is the purpose of this paper to argue for the use of the antitrust
laws as set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 1 and possibly the Clayton
Act,2 to forestall the anticompetitive behavior of virtual world developers.
First, this paper will discuss the general purposes of antitrust law and the
reasons for their preeminence in commercial law. Second, this paper will focus on
the economic effect of real-money trading (“RMT”) in virtual worlds, focusing on
the perceived, as well as the actual, impacts on commerce. Third, this paper will
argue for the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against
tying arrangements as it relates to RMT. Fourth, this paper will argue for the
application of section 2 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against monopoly as it
relates to RMT. Finally, this paper will introduce the possibility of liability under
the Clayton Act, noting the difficulty inherent in such analysis because of the
nature of in-game items.

J.D. Candidate 2010, Columbia Law School; B.A. Political Science 2002, University of
Pennsylvania. The Author would like to thank Professor Greg Lastowka, Rutgers School of Law,
Camden, and Professor Scott Hemphill, Columbia Law School, for their advice, insight, and
encouragement, as well as the staff of the Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
for its editorial assistance.
1
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006).
2
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
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II. PURPOSES OF ANTITRUST LAW
In its relatively brief existence, the Sherman Act has received some of the
highest protection of all of our federal laws. Less than ninety years after its
enactment, Justice Thurgood Marshall described the antitrust laws, particularly the
Sherman Act, as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise.” 3 As Marshall saw them,
they were “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms.”4 Earlier courts have also described the Sherman Act as “a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.”5 As Justice Black explained in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States:
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation
of
our
democratic political and social institutions.6
While the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition, there are
certain practices which, “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue,” are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use.”7 Some of these practices which the courts
have held to be per se unreasonable under section 1 of the Sherman Act include
price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements. 8 It is this
last practice that is of particular relevance in virtual worlds.

While section 1 is the most frequently invoked section of the Act,9 it is
incomplete because it only applies to conduct by two or more actors. 10
Accordingly, Congress addressed this deficiency in section 2, 11 effectively
conferring upon the federal courts “a new jurisdiction to apply a ‘common law’
against monopolizing.”12 Unlike section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 2 is aimed
not at improper conduct but “at a pernicious market structure in which the
concentration of power saps the salubrious influence of competition.” 13 Judge
3

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Id.
5
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
6
N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4.
7
Id. at 5.
8
Id.
9
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
10
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979).
11
“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
12
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272 (quoting 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 40 (1978)).
13
Id.
4
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Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America explained that the
Sherman Act is based on the following belief: “that possession of unchallenged
economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial
progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable
disposition to let well enough alone.”14 Judge Hand went on to explain that
Congress was not “actuated by economic motives alone” in enacting section 2.15
Indeed, “[c]onsiderations of political and social policy form a major part of our
aversion to monopolies, for concentration of power in the hands of a few obstructs
opportunities for the rest.” 16 Yet, in reviewing monopoly claims under section 2,
courts must be cautious not to let the Sherman Act “be invoked perversely in favor
of those who seek protection against the rigors of competition.” 17 As Judge Hand
is often quoted as saying, “The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.” 18 The balancing of successful
innovation on the one hand and competition on the other is a difficult process not
easily resolved, and of the utmost concern when it comes to the study of virtual
worlds.
III. ECONOMIC EFFECT OF REAL-MONEY TRADING IN VIRTUAL WORLDS
Since around 1987, players of virtual worlds have traded items from the
games for real money, or RMT.19 Though the statistics are imprecise, they are
quite staggering. There are over 20 million people playing such games, and the
global amount of RMT is somewhere between $100 million and over $1 billion
annually.20 Edward Castronova, in his landmark 2001 article, noted that nearly a
third of the adults paying for one virtual world spent more time in the world in a
typical week than they do working for pay. 21 The issue has become quite
controversial and divisive, leading to several lawsuits. 22 Additionally, publications
have described unseemly images of overworked “gold farmers” all over the
world.23 Beyond all this, however, the main reason cited in favor of the
14

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id.
16
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273.
17
Id.
18
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
19
Edward Castronova, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Real-Money Trade in the Products of Synthetic
Economies, 8 INFO, at 2 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917124.
20
Id. at 4.
21
Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the
Cyberian Frontier, at 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 618,
2001) [hereinafter Castronova, Virtual Worlds], available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?
abstract_id=294828.
22
Complaint, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. May
22, 2007); Complaint, Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entm’t, Ltd., No. 07-21403 (S.D. Fla. Aug, 17,
2007).
23
See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all;
JULIAN
DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY: OR HOW I QUIT MY DAY JOB AND MADE MILLIONS TRADING VIRTUAL
15
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prohibition of RMT is that it “disturbs the game’s atmosphere; it is said to be
‘wrong’ and ‘against the rules’.”24 For these reasons, among others, nearly all
virtual world developers have prohibited the practice of RMT through their End
User License Agreements (“EULAs”) or their Terms of Service/Use
(“TOS/TOU”).25 An excerpt of such a provision, from Sony’s Everquest II User
Agreement and Software License, states as follows: “You may not buy, sell or
auction (or host or facilitate the ability to allow others to buy, sell or auction) any
Game account, characters, items, coin or copyrighted material or any other
intellectual property owned or controlled by us or our licensors False.” 26
Though potential antitrust liability has not been thoroughly examined in this
burgeoning field, several scholars have discussed the perceived economic effects
of virtual worlds generally, and RMT in particular. 27 As Castronova explains, a
virtual world’s business success derives from “[its] ability to attract customers who
are willing to pay an on-going fee to visit the world, and that requires [virtual
worlds] to offer a form of entertainment that is persistently more attractive than the
competition.”28 According to Castronova, the true source of a virtual world’s
success lies in the nature of scarcity: “Constraints create the possibility of
achievement, and it is the drive to achieve something with the avatar that seems to
create an obsessive interest in her well-being.”29 Yet in-game items are unique in
that they are “infinitely-durable goods,” the stock of which rises continually as
more and more people enter the virtual world.30 What results is a decrease in
demand and thus a fall in RMT price; indeed, the only reason such markets persist
is that virtual worlds continue to introduce new items, whose initial scarcity
sustains their demand for a time. 31 This leads to a network monopoly, driven by
the fact that most users seem to be willing to “live” in at most one virtual world at
a time, as switching worlds is costly and requires time to reacquaint oneself. 32
Despite this tendency toward network monopoly, Castronova suggests
several reasons why the virtual market is not likely to be monopolized. 33 First, he
notes differing tastes and the fact that production of game content and its
maintenance are such labor intensive activities make it difficult for one developer
LOOT,18–19 (2006).
24
Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 19, at 13.
25
Arseni Starodoumov, Real Money Trade Model in Virtual Economies, at 17 (June 16, 2005)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute of International Business),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958286&rec=1&srcabs=917124.
26
Id. at 39.
27
See, e.g., Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 21; Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 752, 2002) [hereinafter
Castronova, Virtual Economies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=338
500&rec=1&srcabs=294828; Starodoumov, supra note 25; Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra
note 19; Jun-Sok Huhh, Economic Analysis on Online Game Service (Feb. 5, 2009) (unpublished
comment, on file with the Seoul National University School of Economics), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335120.
28
Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 21, at 8–9.
29
Id. at 15.
30
Id. at 23.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 8.
33
Castronova, On Virtual Economies, supra note 27, at 24–27.
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to produce a world big enough to monopolize the market. 34 Second, he argues that
congestion tends away from monopoly, the reduction of which can only be
accomplished through the addition of more content. 35 Yet, Castronova notes that
“[i]n every game currently on the market, the owners consider it their right to
introduce changes to game mechanics at any time, without prior consultation with
the players,” leading to the possibility of accounts being terminated and thus losing
market value overnight.36 He argues that player protest and exits are powerful
resistance options, however, we are yet to see a widespread change in policy, and
the subscription base of virtual worlds has only increased. 37 It is the argument of
this paper that the prohibitive switching costs and the developer’s control over the
game’s content, particularly its ability to increase or decrease in-game items, leads
to the potential for antitrust liability.
The introduction of RMT leads to a common quandary: While such
transactions arguably improve the well-being of both parties and increase their
enjoyment of the game, it can ruin “the ambience of the game world.”38 Yet, the
policies set forth by virtual worlds regarding RMT have universally been imposed
“on the people rather than with the people.”39 Given the closed nature of
individual worlds, the basic priceable input for asset growth is time.40 The
challenge level of any virtual world depends on the assets and characteristics the
player has or is in progress of attaining, but the challenge level offered by game
designers will not be equal to the ideal challenge level of one or more players. 41
When discrepancies are sufficiently high between the designers’ challenge level
and the ideal challenge level, the player’s satisfaction will be so low that he will be
tempted to increase his assets to change the game’s challenge level. 42 Because of
the virtual world’s limitations, the player will price the virtual assets needed for the
higher game satisfaction in real world currency. 43 Several reasons have been
argued for why RMT is detrimental and produces external welfare losses, but the
economic impact is nominal.44 Castronova points out, however, that a one percent
increase in RMT would only have a 1/20th of one percent impact on the demand
34
Id. at 25. It is interesting to note that Castronova’s possibility for increased production (“opening
your game code to the public”) is precisely the model of virtual worlds like Second Life.
35
Id. at 25–26. A third argument is his claim that the huge switching costs between worlds should
lead to competitors offering new players the opportunity to start their avatars at a higher level of wealth
and ability if they can provide evidence of a high level in another game. Id. at 26. As Castronova
argues, “[B]y not offering this kind of monetary opt-in, the companies implicitly encourage the buying
and selling of avatars outside the game.” Id. Of course, the existence of countless EULAs prohibiting
such trade seems to indicate otherwise.
36
Id. at 33.
37
Id., at 35.
38
Id. at 34.
39
Castronova, On Virtual Economies, supra note 27, at 34.
40
Starodoumov, supra note 25, at 31.
41
Id. at 32.
42
Id. at 33.
43
Id.
44
Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 19, at 15–19. Castronova sets forth five reasons:
(1) disrupts the game’s fantasy atmosphere; (2) causes inflation; (3) encourages misuse of the game’s
resources; (4) encourages misuse of game’s communication systems; and (5) leads to high customer
service costs. Id.
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for subscriptions, and a 1/20th of one percent impact on customer service costs. 45
IV. TYING ARRANGEMENTS
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as “an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he [or she] will not purchase that
product from any other supplier.”46 Historically, courts have held that tying
arrangements serve “hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,” 47
and are per se unreasonable “whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market
for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce is
affected.”48 However, the Court has made clear that “every refusal to sell two
products separately cannot be said to restrain competition.” 49 If each of the
products may be purchased separately in a competitive market, one seller’s
decision to sell the two products together imposes no unreasonable restraint on
either market, particularly if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire
package or its several parts. 50 It follows that virtual worlds which ban real-money
trading may be involved in tying arrangements; by enforcing this ban, they are
effectively preventing competing suppliers from freely selling in-game products.51
Courts have concluded:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the
seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer
into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. 52

Thus, when such “forcing” is present, competition on the merits in the
market for the tied item is restrained and a Sherman Act violation exists. 53
Accordingly, courts will condemn tying arrangements “when the seller has some
special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market.”54 From the consumer’s
45

Id. at 31–32.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958).
47
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
48
N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6.
49
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984).
50
Id. at 11–12; see N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 n.4 (explaining that “where the buyer is free to take
either product by itself there is no tying problem even though the seller may also offer the two items as
a unit at a single price”).
51
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11–12; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 n.4. Though not the
focus of this article, the use of third-party software (or “bots”) would also arguably implicate the same
antitrust issues.
52
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
53
Id. at 12–13; see Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (“By
conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of
buyers’ independent judgment as to the ‘tied’ product’s merits and insulates it from the competitive
stresses of the open market.”).
54
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13–14; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
46
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standpoint, the freedom to select the best bargain in the second market is impaired
by his [or her] need to purchase the tying product from, and by an inability to
evaluate the true cost of either product when they are available only as a package,
something the Supreme Court has defined as “lifecycle pricing.” 55 It is this
question of market power that would likely pose one of the more difficult problems
in enforcing a claim of an invalid tying arrangement when it comes to virtual
worlds. This question is particularly important because when the seller does
possess such market power, an antitrust violation can be established “only by
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition in the relevant market.” 56
The virtual world developer would likely claim that a single virtual world has little
market power on its own, and its activities are thus disciplined by competition with
other developers. While persuasive, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. provides a convincing response to this
argument.
Thus, as the Jefferson Parish court held, “[a]ny inquiry into the validity of a
tying arrangement must focus on the market or markets in which the two products
are sold, for that is where the anticompetitive forcing has its impact.”57 This issue
involves consideration of first whether petitioners are in fact selling two separate
products that may be tied together, and if so, whether they have used their market
power to force their customers to accept the tying arrangement.58 This analysis
leads to another potential issue in the virtual world industry: Are the virtual world
and the in-game products separate and distinct, or are the products identical and the
market the same?59 Once we closely examine the economic aspects as well as the
relevant case law, we see that this issue is easily addressed, and the virtual world is
indeed distinct and separate from its in-game products.
V. MARKET POWER
Early tying cases involved patent infringement suits and initially embraced
Chief Justice White’s dissent in Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co.,60 holding that a patent
or similar monopoly presumptively confers market power upon the seller. 61 Over
the years, however, the Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements
U.S. 451, 477–78 (1992); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 620
(1977); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 517–18 (1969); United
States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 48 n.5 (1962); N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6–7.
55
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473–74 (“For the service-market
price to affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the ‘package’
. . . at the time of purchase; that is, consumers must engage in accurate lifecyle pricing.”); see also
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15, n. 24 (“Especially where market imperfections exist, purchasers may
not be fully sensitive to the price or quality implications of a tying arrangement, and hence it may
impede competition on the merits.”) (quoting Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive
Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982)).
56
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17–18.
57
Id. at 18.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 19–20; Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613–14 (1953).
60
224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912).
61
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45–47
(1962); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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diminished, and rather than relying on assumptions, the Court shifted toward
requiring a showing of market power in the tying product. 62 Eventually, Congress
amended the Patent Code to eliminate the presumption in the patent misuse
context.63 In 2006, the Supreme Court effectively killed the patent presumption,
holding that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant has market power in the tying product.” 64 Perhaps most relevant
to the realm of virtual worlds is the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission’s 1995 joint statement that they “will not presume that a patent,
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.” 65
Thus, for a tying arrangement case to succeed against a virtual world, the
developer’s copyright alone is insufficient to establish market power; the plaintiff
must present proof of power in the relevant market. 66 The Supreme Court has held
market power to be the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would
not do in a competitive market.”67 It has been further defined as “the ability of a
single seller to raise price and restrict output.”68
A helpful place to start the study of market power in virtual worlds is the
case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States.69 In 1864 and 1870,
Congress granted Northern Pacific Railway’s predecessor (“Railroad”)
approximately 40 million acres of land to facilitate its construction of a railroad
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound. 70 By 1949, the Railroad had sold about 37
million acres of its holdings, but had reserved mineral rights in 6.5 million of those
acres.71 In many of its sales contracts, and in most of its lease agreements, the
Railroad had inserted “preferential routing” clauses which compelled the purchaser
or lessee “to ship over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the
land, provided that its rates (and in some instances its service) were equal to those
of competing carriers.”72 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, held that
the Railroad “possessed substantial economic power by virtue of its extensive
landholdings which it used as leverage to induce large numbers of purchasers and
lessees to give it preference, to the exclusion of its competitors.”73 The Court
further noted that the “vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic
power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in another, regardless of
the source from which the power is derived and whether the power takes the form

62
Compare Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949), with Fortner
II, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
63
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006).
64
See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006).
65
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.2
(Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
66
See Ill. Tool, 547 U.S. at 42–43.
67
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (quoting Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
68
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
69
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
70
Id. at 2–3.
71
Id. at 3.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 7.
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of a monopoly or not.” 74
When we analogize to virtual worlds, it is easy to see that much of the
Court’s concern is present. One can hardly dispute the fact that many virtual
worlds possess extensive landholdings, as well as the ability to increase or
decrease in-game content, which it can use as leverage over its users to give it
preference when it comes to purchasing in-game products.75 While the developer
would certainly argue that it does not require any user to affirmatively purchase
any particular in-game product, by preventing a user from purchasing an in-game
product from a third party, it is forcing the user to take the extra time, and thus pay
additional subscription costs, needed to raise the necessary amount of in-game
currency, something he or she would not necessarily do “in a competitive
market.”76 In doing so, the virtual world developer possesses both the ability to
raise price and restrict output.77
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak provides further support for
the notion that virtual worlds may have sufficient market power to implicate the
Sherman Act’s section 1 prohibition against tying arrangements. 78 In the Eastman
Kodak case, the principal issue was whether a defendant’s lack of market power in
the primary market precluded, as a matter of law, the possibility of market power
in derivative aftermarkets.79 After easily holding that plaintiffs had established a
tie through Kodak’s policy of selling parts to third parties only if they agreed not to
buy service from independent service organizations, the Court moved to the more
difficult question of market power.80 Kodak argued that even if it conceded
monopoly share of the relevant parts market, it could not actually exercise the
necessary market power for a section 1 violation because competition existed in
the equipment market.81 Thus, Kodak argued that it could not “raise prices of
service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market
because any increase in profits from a higher price in the aftermarkets would be
offset by a corresponding loss in profits from lower equipment sales.”82 The Court
refused to accept Kodak’s argument because it did not “accurately explain the
behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex durable goods: the
existence of significant information and switching costs.”83
The Court first focused on the fact that “[f]or the service-market price to
affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of
the ‘package’—equipment, service, and parts—at the time of purchase; that is
consumers must engage in accurate lifecycle pricing.”84 To do so, the customer
74

N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 11.
Id.
76
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (quoting
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
77
See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
78
Id. at 451.
79
Id. at 454–55.
80
Id. at 463–64.
81
Id. at 465.
82
Id. at 466.
83
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473 (1992) (emphasis added).
84
Id.
75
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must acquire and digest a substantial amount of information, including “data on
price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance
the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of
breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of
‘downtime,’ and losses incurred from downtime.” 85 Because of the potentially
high cost of acquiring such information, and the possibility of price discrimination
between sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, the Court explained that “it
ma[de] little sense to assume . . . that equipment-purchasing decisions are based on
an accurate assessment of the total cost of equipment, service, and parts over the
lifetime of the machine.”86
When we apply the lifecycle analysis to virtual worlds, we see an even
stronger case for the existence of market power on behalf of the developer. It is
nearly impossible for consumers to completely inform themselves of the total cost
of the virtual world “package” at the time of subscription. 87 To do so, the user
would have to acquire and digest information, such as price information for the
world (and potential competitors), availability of in-game products needed to
operate, upgrade, or enhance the experience, any additional subscription costs, the
time required to acquire in-game products, and any potential changes the world
may make during the life of the virtual world. 88 Because of the potentially high
cost of acquiring such information, the possibility of price discrimination between
sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, and the inability of consumers to
predict future changes to the virtual world, it is hard to see how users could engage
in effective lifecycle pricing.89
A second factor the Court considered was the cost to current owners of
switching to a different product.90 The Court noted that “[i]f the cost of switching
is high, consumers who have already purchased the equipment, and are thus
‘locked in,’ will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing
equipment brands.”91 Additionally, where the seller can price discriminate
between its locked-in customers and potential new customers, “this strategy is even
more likely to prove profitable,” because a seller “could simply charge new
customers below-marginal cost on the equipment and recoup the charges in
service.”92 This switching cost analysis is particularly relevant to virtual worlds.
Any regular virtual world user would argue that the cost of switching virtual
worlds is prohibitively high.93 Not only are in-game items of no use in other
virtual worlds, the added social elements unique to each virtual world make it
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undesirable to switch to a different world. 94 Furthermore, virtual worlds often
engage in price discrimination among existing users and new users. Second Life,
for example, initially taxed its residents per object they created, but eventually
shifted to a property-based economy, establishing a $9.95 per month fee for those
who wanted to own land.95 It is very likely that a court could infer that a virtual
world has sufficient market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the
aftermarkets.96 Indeed, it is just as plausible that a virtual world could choose to
gain immediate profits by exerting such market power where locked-in customers,
high information costs, and discriminatory pricing exist. 97
VI. DISTINCT AND SEPARATE PRODUCTS
Another issue that must be addressed when determining whether or not a
tying arrangement exists in a virtual world is whether the tying and tied products
are indeed separate and distinct products.98 The Jefferson Parish court explained
that “the answer to the question whether one or two products are involved turns not
on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the demand
for the two items.”99 The Court stresses the fact that a functional link is not in
itself sufficient to reject a tying arrangement claim, noting that the Court “has often
found arrangements involving functionally linked products at least one of which is
useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.” 100 The question, thus, is
whether there is a possibility that the economic effect of the arrangement is that a
defendant has foreclosed competition on the merits in a product market distinct
from the market for the tying item. 101
In Jefferson Parish, the alleged tying arrangement involved the hospital’s
contract providing that all anesthesiological services required by its patients would
be performed by one particular group.102 The Court determined that no tying
arrangement could exist unless there existed “a sufficient demand for the purchase
of anesthesiological services separate from the hospital services to identify a
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distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer anesthesiological services
separately from hospital services.”103 The Court held that the anesthesiological
services could have been provided separately and could have been selected either
by the individual patient or by one of the patient’s doctors if the hospital did not
insist on the tying arrangement. 104 Furthermore, the Court held that consumers
“differentiate between anesthesiological services and the other hospital services
provided by [the hospital].”105
When we apply this analysis to virtual worlds, we see that a subscription to a
virtual world is separate and distinct from in-game items. Though these products
are functionally linked, the economic effect of a ban on real money trading is that
the virtual world will foreclose competition on the merits in a product market
distinct from the market for the virtual world itself. 106
Also, there is
unquestionably a sufficient demand for the purchase of in-game items separate
from the virtual world to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient
to offer in-game items separately from a virtual world subscription. 107 Indeed,
many users who are willing to purchase in-game items from third parties do so
because it is quicker and easier than playing the game long enough to obtain the
items.108
The Supreme Court has held that if a firm has been “attempting to exclude
rivals on some basis other than efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as
predatory,” and thus exclusionary.109 The existence of third party in-game item
dealers may increase the demand for the virtual world itself. By allowing a
separate market for in-game items, a virtual world may be able to attract
subscribers to its site that may not have been willing to do so given the perceived
time commitment of acquiring valuable items.110 Indeed, when viewed in light of
the market power each individual world possesses, the tying arrangement seems
not only invalid, but counterproductive.
VII. MONOPOLIZATION
The Supreme Court has held:
The offense of monopoly under [section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
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business acumen, or historic accident.111

The Court has defined monopoly power as “the power to control prices or
exclude competition.”112 Furthermore, the existence of such power “may be
inferred from the predominant share of the market.” 113 Important indicators of
monopoly power include the defendant’s market share (often expressed as a
percentage) and any barriers to entry. 114 As discussed, virtual worlds arguably
have substantial market power and often possess the power to control prices or
exclude competition. The more important, and concededly more difficult, question
to answer in this context is the question of defining the relevant market. 115 Such a
determination can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the “commercial
realities” faced by consumers.116
The Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. held
that the ultimate question is “whether the defendants control the price and
competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as they are charged
with monopolizing.”117 Of course, every manufacturer is the sole producer of the
particular commodity it makes, so its control depends upon the availability of
alternative commodities for buyers, i.e., whether cross-elasticity of demand
exists.118 One way to determine the presence of cross-elasticity of demand is to
examine the responsiveness of sales of one product to price changes of the other. 119
As the E.I. du Pont court held, “[d]etermination of the competitive market for
commodities depends on how different from one another are the offered
commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one
commodity for another.”120 When a product is controlled by one interest, without
substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power.121 However, when
there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, “illegal
monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to be monopolized
differs from others.”122 Thus, commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purpose make up the relevant market.123
Applying the E.I. du Pont analysis to virtual worlds leads to the ultimate
conclusion that the relevant market for a particular virtual world is the virtual
world itself. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held on several occasions that “in
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some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market.” 124
Conducting a cross-elasticity of demand analysis would show no responsiveness of
sales of one virtual world to price changes of another. 125 For example, a slight
decrease in the subscription price of Second Life would not cause a considerable
number of World of Warcraft users to suddenly switch to Second Life. 126 The two
virtual worlds are quite different from one another in terms of character or use, and
buyers will not substitute one virtual world for another for the various market
power reasons previously described.127 There are no market alternatives that users
may readily use for their purposes, the two worlds are not reasonably
interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose, and thus each individual
virtual world would make up the relevant market for monopoly power analysis. 128
Indeed, one trial court has recently found some virtual worlds not to be
interchangeable in a decision finding Second Life’s Terms of Service to be a
contract of adhesion.129 In Bragg v. Linden Research, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found there to be “no reasonably
available market alternatives [to defeat] a claim of adhesiveness.”130 The court
noted that “[a]lthough it is not the only virtual world on the Internet, Second Life
was the first and only virtual world to specifically grant its participants property
rights in virtual land.”131
The second element of a section 2 claim is the use of monopoly power “to
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor.”132 While the desire to maintain or increase one’s market share is not
in itself an antitrust violation, a monopolist must take care that otherwise lawful
acts do not have anticompetitive effects because of their monopoly power. 133 If a
defendant has taken exclusionary action, such as the tying arrangement previously
described, to maintain its monopoly and used its control to strengthen its monopoly
share, “liability turns, then, on whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain” the
defendant’s actions.134
The Eastman Kodak case provides some helpful examples of the kind of
valid business reasons the Court finds to be potentially questionable. 135 Kodak
first argued that by preventing customers from using independent service
organizations (“ISO”), “it [could] best maintain high quality service for its
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sophisticated equipment” and avoid being “blamed for an equipment
malfunction.”136 The Court refused to grant summary judgment because the ISOs
were able to offer evidence that they not only provided quality service, but also
that their service was “preferred by some Kodak equipment owners.” 137 The Court
also argued that this claim did not mesh with the lifecycle issue, noting that
“Kodak simultaneously claims that its customers are sophisticated enough to make
complex and subtle lifecycle-pricing decisions, and yet too obtuse to distinguish
which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and which are due to bad service.”138
Second, Kodak claimed that the exclusionary actions were valid because
they improved asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs. 139 The
Court took issue with this justification as well, noting that “the inventory of parts
needed to repair Kodak machines turns only on breakdown rates, and those rates
should be the same whether Kodak or ISO’s [sic] perform the repair.” 140 Also, this
justification fails to explain the fact that Kodak “forced [original equipment
manufacturers], equipment owners, and parts brokers not to sell parts to ISO’s
[sic], actions that would have no effect on Kodak’s inventory costs.” 141
Lastly, Kodak claimed that its policies prevented ISOs from “exploit[ing] the
investment Kodak has made in product development, manufacturing and
equipment sales in order to take away Kodak’s service revenues.” 142 The Court
denied summary judgment here as well, noting that “one of the evils proscribed by
the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by
requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.” 143
When we apply this analysis to virtual worlds, we can see how many of the
potential justifications a virtual world developer would likely propose for its
exclusionary conduct with respect to the proposition that RMT should not
constitute a valid business reason.144 A developer would likely argue that there is
a concern about maintaining the quality of in-game items because users may not be
able to tell which avatars have achieved their status through legitimate in-game
success or through third-party means, or even which avatars are actual people or
automated bots. It follows, arguably, that preventing RMT would limit the amount
of inconsistency and uncertainty for players, thus increasing the overall satisfaction
of players.145 However, as in Eastman Kodak, RMT traders would counter with
evidence that their service was preferred by many virtual world subscribers.146
Again, the same lifecycle issue would arise, as previously discussed, because it is
nearly impossible for consumers to completely inform themselves of the total cost
136
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of the virtual world “package” at the time of subscription. 147
Another proposed valid business reason set forth by virtual worlds would
likely be that preventing RMT is valid because it reduces inventory costs and
tempers in-game inflation.148 A court could easily disregard this justification as
well because the inventory of in-game items, as well as in-game currency, is
ultimately in the control of the developer. Should a developer need to control
inventory costs or inflation, they can do so simply through in-game coding.149
Also, as in Eastman Kodak, these justifications would fail to explain why a
developer would prohibit in-game product owners (i.e., users) from selling to real
money traders or brokers because such actions would have no effect on the
developer’s inventory costs.150 Finally, a developer’s claim that such policies
prevent real money traders from exploiting the investment the developer has made
in product development, manufacturing, and sales in order to take away its in-game
trade revenues would likely fail. Such prohibitions would constitute entry barriers
to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously,
something antitrust law explicitly proscribes.151
The Supreme Court has also found actions which forgo short-run benefits in
the interest of reducing competition over the long run to be invalid business
justifications.152 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Court
held that a monopoly, which made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers
from doing business with its smaller rival, was “motivated entirely by a decision to
avoid providing any benefit to [its rival] even though . . . [it] would have entailed
no cost to [defendant] itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and
would have satisfied its potential customers.” 153 The Court further noted that the
defendant “was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived
long-run impact on its smaller rival.”154 This is the same motivation that drives
virtual worlds’ prohibition against RMT. And, as discussed previously, such
actions are not motivated by efficiency concerns.
VIII. APPLICATION OF SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Section 3 of the Clayton Act may also provide some interesting analysis of
virtual worlds.155 A tying arrangement can violate section 3 of the Clayton Act as
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It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
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unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . on the
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well as section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the Clayton Act is violated only when
products are tied to other products, not services. 156 Because the term “commodity”
is not defined in section 3, courts have adopted its natural context (“goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities”) and defined it as “some
type of tangible property that may be leased or sold.” 157 This definition is
arguably problematic for application to virtual worlds.
A claimed tying arrangement in a virtual world would entail the tying of ingame items to the subscription to the virtual world itself through the End User
License Agreement. Courts have held that the following items do not fall within
the definition of a commodity: newspaper advertisements, 158 sponsorship rights,159
banking services,160 extensions of credit,161 franchises,162 trademarks,163
insurance,164 money165, and services166. However, courts have held computer
software to be a commodity for purposes of a tying arrangement under the Clayton
Act.167 In Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that a
computer system manufacturer’s refusal to license its NOVA operating system
software except to purchasers of its NOVA central processing units (“CPUs”)
constituted an unlawful tying arrangement under both the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.168
The Digidyne court first found that the CPU and the operating system were
separate products and that “a demand existed for NOVA instruction set CPUs
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not user or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
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separate from defendant’s [operating system], and that each element of the NOVA
computer system could have been provided separately and selected separately by
customers if defendant had not compelled purchasers to take both.” 169
Additionally, the court found abundant evidence that defendant’s operating system
was “distinctive and particularly desirable to a substantial number of buyers, and
could not be readily produced by other sellers.”170 Indeed, defendant’s insistence
upon licensing only to those who purchased the instruction set CPU “led buyers to
purchase defendant’s NOVA CPUs who would not have bought them or would
have bought them elsewhere absent the tying arrangement.” 171 This fact pattern is
analogous to the kind of situation we find in the virtual world context. In the realm
of RMT, users can acquire the gaming software and in-game items separately if a
developer does not compel the user to get both from them. 172 Each virtual world’s
software is distinctive and particularly desirable to a substantial number of buyers,
and is not readily produced by other sellers. 173 As in Digidyne, insistence upon
licensing only to those who acquired the in-game items from the game forces some
users to acquire them in-game when they would have preferred to buy them more
efficiently elsewhere.174
Perhaps the more interesting question is with respect to the tied product:
whether it is an in-game item or in-game currency. While software is considered a
commodity under the Clayton Act, as previously discussed, money is not. 175 So,
there is an argument that in-game currency would not fall within the definition of
commodity and a section 3 claim would not apply. 176 Whether in-game items
would qualify as a commodity is a more difficult question. Applying the definition
set forth in Satellite T Associate v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., courts
are likely to pounce on the lack of “tangible” characteristics, although such items
are easily leased or sold.177 Though some recent commentators have suggested
that virtual goods and virtual alter-egos can be considered property under the
current legal norms, current legislation has not yet developed a proper framework
for managing virtual property conflicts. 178 Strategically speaking, it may not be
worth claiming in-game items to be software as well, as the court may conclude
that the software and the in-game items are not separate and distinct items,
effectively destroying any section 3 claim. 179 Thus, it makes more sense to focus
on the Sherman Act as a source of claim, rather than risk the chance that a Clayton
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Act claim would be dismissed.
IX. CONCLUSION
As we see a vast increase in the impact of virtual worlds on our real-world
economy, there comes a point when the desire to encourage and foster this new
and exciting technology should give way to a need to protect competition in the
marketplace. While we should not punish those who have achieved success, we
cannot sit idly by and watch as they exploit their market power and destroy
competition, often at the expense of the very users they are supposedly trying to
attract.

